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STRENGTHENING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE OSCE SYMPOSIUM
OSCE: Do we really need 
an international legal 
personality and why?
As part of this symposium, the Völkerrechtsblog has 
published excellent contributions of Christian Tomuschat, 
Cedric Ryngaert and Isabelle Ley. All the three distinguished 
authors have looked at the multifaceted problem of legal 
formalization of the OSCE from various angles andhave 
provided rather helpful reflections on the current state of 
affairs. This contribution deals with the issue in a broader 
political context.
OSCE in a geopolitical turmoil: back to the initial mission?

The political reality in which the OSCE now operates reminds 
more and more of the time when the organisation (then – the 
CSCE) was created. The conflict in Georgia was seen in 2008 
as the organization’s “low point” in its inability to prevent an 
armed conflict between its two participating states. The 
events in Ukraine constitute a direct affront to the founding 
Helsinki principles.
It seems that the dream of a common space of security and 
rule of law from Vancouver to Vladivostok, as embodied by 
the OSCE documents of the 1990s, has faded away. The high 
aspirations clashed with the realities of authoritarianism and 
disregard to international commitments that continued to 
prevail in a growing number of participating states, and 
peaked with Russia’s actions. The climate in the organization 
itself which transpires through harsh political statements and 
boycotts of official meetings is also certainly not a good sign 
for the “security and cooperation in Europe”.
Of course, the comparison with the Cold War may be 
premature. The conflict between Russia and the West could 
be dramatic, but it is definitely not a war between the two 
ideological camps. However, it indeed presents strikingly 
different perspectives for the OSCE as compared to the 
1990s.
Rather paradoxically, the recent deployment of the OSCE 
special monitoring mission in Ukraine is now seen by some 
observers as “regained political relevance” of the 
organization”. The massive setback in the “East (Russia)
–West” relations has unexpectedly revived the OSCE’s 
original political mission as the organization offered the best 
and probably the only available framework for managing the 
crisis and avoiding further escalation of the conflict. 
However, taken into account the OSCE consensus system, as 
well as a legal and political deadlock in Russia-Ukraine 
relations, even that “success” has its limits.
The current crisis has implications reaching far beyond 
Ukraine. Russia’s entire western and southern neighborhoods 
from the Baltics to Central Asia could become the new hot 
spots. A significant number of states in the post-Soviet space 
such as Belarus and Kazakhstan now show greater interest in 
the OSCE than in the recent past. It seems that the 
geopolitical confrontation brings the organization to its 
initial role and presents the best natural environment for the 
functioning of its security forum and negotiations platform.
Benefits and Costs of the OSCE “Legalization” 
Against this background, an interesting question arises – do 
we really need a “fully legalized” OSCE?
As Professor Tomuschat rightly noted, since its inception the 
organization has been kept apart from the realm of 
international law proper. This “softness” of the OSCE, 
however, makes it more flexible, and thus has also brought 
OSCE some benefits. In a way, OSCE is bringing international 
law, although in its rather soft form, to the European grey 
zones. This – often invisible – work should not be 
underestimated.
The States, however, are not willing to use even those OSCE 
legal instruments that are already available. The story of the 
OSCE Court of Conciliation and Arbitration (the only 
“properly” created organ of OSCE) is very telling in this 
regard. Notwithstanding all the efforts of the court, no state 
has ever brought a single dispute to it. The States regard it as 
(just/yet) another expensive arbitration in Genève. For 
instance, the Court has not even been mentioned as a 
potential dispute settlement forum for Crimea, while both 
Russia and Ukraine are state parties to the Stockholm 
Convention. It appears that states are not willing to resort to 
OSCE international “legal” arrangements.
A “full” international legal personality would be able to 
transform OSCE in what should actually be called another 
classical interstate international organization. As 
“legalization” of the OSCE was at a certain point of time 
Russia’s idea, a valid question arises: as a “fully equipped” 
international organization, could it have prevented the 
Ukrainian crisis?
It may be, however, that the OSCE legal personality project is 
a failure story from the very beginning. If consensus among 
the participating states would be reached at some stage, 
what would be its real benefit? On the other hand, the 
Council of Europe, – another huge pan-European 
organization, and especially its “political” part, – has also 
demonstrated its limited efficiency and inability to prevent 
major backlashes, such as the Ukrainian conflict or the 
current crackdown in Turkey.
From the outset, OSCE was a product of fear and hypocrisy. 
Its strengthening and “legalisation” may have implications 
reaching beyond its routine functions. By signing the Helsinki 
Act, the Soviet Union had committed to respect human rights 
and democratic freedoms – an obligation which it was not 
going to comply with. In the current realities, not only can 
OSCE create a dangerous illusion of the dialogue, but foster 
such illusion into international law. Such 
“institutionalization” of the confrontation would become a 
dangerous signal. Authoritarian States could see in a 
“legalized” OSCE a “convenient” alternative to the Council of 
Europe.
This legal “strengthening” of the OSCE may also have a 
paradoxical effect in strengthening the confrontational 
element in Europe, the division of Europe into spheres of 
influence and geopolitical battle between “East” and “West”. 
By compromising its founding principles, OSCE may in fact 
contribute to the general setback.
Probably the more realistic and more productive way would 
be just to continue with the core OSCE mission, and leave the 
OSCE as a forum for negotiations, while international lawyers 
will concentrate on the practical solutions for the OSCE on a 
national level (States may still rely on the old-fashioned 
Lotus-type discretion in dealing with immunity and other 
OSCE – related issues in domestic law).
As far as the principal issue is concerned, the real choice for 
the OSCE should not be overlooked. It seems that 
organization now has to decide whether to cling to common 
values established in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and 
reaffirmed in Paris in 1990, thus risking to antagonize Russia 
and other authoritarian members, or to serve again, like 
during the Cold War, as an inclusive cooperative security 
dialogue forum for both democracies and authoritarian 
regimes.
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